| |
| 1886–87 |
| |
| Rapid development of nationalist and revenge agitation in France, the reaction to Jules Ferry's policy of understanding with Germany regarding colonial expansion. | 1 |
| |
| 1887, Feb. 12 |
| |
| FIRST MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT, between Britain and Italy, adhered to by Austria (March 24) and Spain (May 4). The agreement took the form of an exchange of notes (Anglo-Italian; Anglo-Austrian; Italian-Spanish, acceded to by Germany and Austria, May 21). Bismarck had encouraged the combination, exploiting the acute Anglo-French tension (over Egypt) and the Italian-French tension (tariff war, etc.). The notes provided for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean, including the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas. Italy was to support the British policy in Egypt and Britain the Italian policy in North Africa. The Anglo-Austrian note stressed rather the community of interest of the two powers in the Balkans. Spain promised not to make an agreement with France regarding North Africa that would be aimed at Italy, Austria, or Germany. Britain refused to bind itself to any specific action, but the effect of the agreements was to provide a basis for common action in the event of disturbance in the Mediterranean by France or Russia. | 2 |
| |
| Feb. 20 |
| |
| RENEWAL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE for five years. Negotiations had been carried on since Nov. 1886, the Italians demanding more far-reaching support of their interests in North Africa. This Bismarck was willing to concede, in order to be assured of Italy's friendship in case of a clash with France. But Austria objected, her attention being focused on the Balkans. In the end the old alliance was renewed and additional German-Italian and Austro-Italian agreements made. Germany promised that in the event of French efforts to expand in North Africa, if Italy was obliged to take action or even make war on France, Germany would come to the aid of Italy. If France was defeated, Germany would not object to Italy's taking “territorial guaranties for the security of the frontiers and of her maritime position.” The Austro-Italian agreement provided for the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans and the Middle East. If this became impossible, neither party should occupy territory except in agreement with the other on the principle of reciprocal compensation. This was not to apply to the eventual annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. | 3 |
| |
| May 22 |
| |
| The Drummond-Wolff convention, by which Britain agreed to evacuate Egypt within three years but reserved the right to reoccupy in case of disorder. This convention was wrecked by the opposition of France and Russia—the first striking case of Franco-Russian collaboration against Great Britain. | 4 |
| |
| June 18 |
| |
| Signature of a secret RUSSIAN-GERMAN TREATY (the Reinsurance Treaty) to replace the expiring Alliance of the Three Emperors, which Russia refused to renew. The two powers promised each other neutrality in the event of either one's becoming involved in war with a third power (but this was not to apply in case of aggressive war of Germany against France, or of Russia against Austria). They were to work for the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, and Germany was to recognize Russia's preponderant influence in Bulgaria. The principle of the closure of the Straits was once more reaffirmed. An additional and very secret protocol promised moral and diplomatic support “to the measures which His Majesty (the tsar) may deem it necessary to take to control the key of his empire” (i.e., the entrance to the Black Sea). This famous treaty represented Bismarck's effort to keep Russia from France and to buy its friendship by signing away things that he knew Russia could never get on account of British and Austrian opposition. On the Russian side the treaty reflected the victory of the foreign minister, Nicholas Giers, over the extreme nationalist groups. | 5 |
| |
| Dec. 12 |
| |
| SECOND MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT among Britain, Austria, and Italy (Bismarck having refused to participate—Bismarck-Salisbury correspondence, Nov.). It restated the principle of the status quo in the Balkans and the importance of keeping the Ottoman Empire free of all foreign domination. The empire must not cede its rights in Bulgaria to any other power or allow occupation of Bulgaria by any other power. Neither must it give up any rights in the Straits or in Asia Minor. | 6 |
| |
| |
