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| 1938, March |
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| The AUSTRO-GERMAN CRISIS and the annexation of Austria by Germany (See April 10) created remarkably little tension in international relations. Italy, which might have been expected to offer stiff opposition, was so bound up with Spanish and Mediterranean affairs that Mussolini had to accept the inevitable as graciously as possible. France, at the moment, was in the midst of a cabinet crisis. The British appear to have been reconciled to the German move from the outset. Beyond a few half-hearted attempts to revive the Stresa front of 1935, the powers acquiesced and accepted the fait accompli. | 1 |
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| March 16–19 |
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| The Polish-Lithuanian crisis (See March 16–19). | 2 |
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| April 16 |
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| Conclusion of the Anglo-Italian pact, which had been under negotiation for some time. The British being eager to free themselves of Italian hostility in the Mediterranean and Middle East and Mussolini apparently desiring some counterweight to the oppressive friendship of Hitler, the two parties succeeded in liquidating their differences. Great Britain was to recognize Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia and use its influence to induce other states to do likewise. Italy was to respect Spanish territory and withdraw its “volunteers” at the end of the war (at that time regarded as very near). Italy was to desist from hostile propaganda in the Middle East, and both powers were to collaborate in maintaining the status quo in the Red Sea. The provisions of the agreement were to come into force as soon as the Spanish affair had been settled. | 3 |
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| May 19–20 |
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| First Czech crisis (See 1938, March–May). | 4 |
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| July 19–21 |
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| State visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Paris, clearly meant as a counterdemonstration of Anglo-French solidarity. | 5 |
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| Aug. 21–23 |
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| Meeting of the Little Entente statesmen at Bled (Yugoslavia). The three powers recognized Hungary's right to rearm and arranged for the conclusion of nonaggression pacts. | 6 |
| Relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia grew seriously strained again in August and produced a second crisis in September. that brought the powers to the verge of war. | 7 |
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| Sept. 7–29 |
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| Height of the GERMAN-CZECH CRISIS (See July–Aug). The Sudeten leaders broke off negotiations with the government (Sept. 7) after an affray at Moravska Ostrava. Discussions were resumed (Sept. 10), but disorders, provoked by extremists, became more and more frequent. On Sept. 12 Hitler, in a speech at Nürnberg, first demanded in no uncertain terms that the Sudeten Germans be given the right of self-determination. This address was the signal for widespread disorders and the proclamation of martial law by the government (Sept. 13). Henlein and other leaders fled across the frontier (Sept. 15). To meet this dangerous situation, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in agreement with the French government, proposed a personal conference to Hitler. | 8 |
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| Sept. 15 |
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| CHAMBERLAIN-HITLER CONFERENCE AT BERCHTESGADEN. The German chancellor baldly stated his demand for annexation of the German areas of Czechoslovakia on the basis of self-determination, and did not conceal his readiness to risk a war to attain his end. Chamberlain returned to London, as did Runciman from Prague. On Sept. 18 Premier Édouard Daladier and Georges Bonnet (French foreign minister) arrived in London. Decision reached to advise and urge the Czech government to accept Hitler's terms, promising an international guaranty of the rump state. After long deliberations, the Czech government (Sept. 20) suggested arbitration on the basis of the German-Czech Locarno treaty of 1925. This proposal was at once rejected by Britain and France as inadequate. After further pressure and threats of desertion by France and Britain, the Prague government finally yielded (Sept. 21), despite the fact that Poland and Hungary had both put in additional claims for territory. The Hodza cabinet resigned (Sept. 22), and a new government was formed by Gen. Jan Sirovy, a popular military leader. | 9 |
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| Sept. 22–23 |
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| CHAMBERLAIN'S SECOND VISIT TO HITLER AT GODESBERG. Further demands of the German chancellor: surrender of the predominantly German territories at once, without removal or destruction of military or economic establishments; plebiscites to be held in areas with large German minority by Nov. 25, under German-Czech or international supervision. These terms were regarded by Chamberlain as quite unacceptable, and as an unwarranted extension of the original German demands. | 10 |
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| Sept. 24–29 |
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| ACUTE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS, the most serious since 1918. The Czech government ordered full mobilization, and the Great Powers took precautions of every kind. Italy, however, came out more and more definitely on the German side. Daladier and Bonnet again came to London (Sept. 26), and the decision was evidently reached to support Czechoslovakia in resisting the extended German demands. Chamberlain appealed to Hitler for a conference so that the cession of Sudeten territory, already agreed on by all, might be effected by discussion, not by force. President Roosevelt also appealed to Hitler and urged a conference (Sept. 27). Finally (Sept. 28) Hitler, apparently persuaded by Mussolini (to whom both Chamberlain and Roosevelt had appealed), agreed to a conference. | 11 |
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| Sept. 29 |
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| THE MUNICH CONFERENCE AND AGREEMENT. Hitler, Ribbentrop, Mussolini, Ciano, Chamberlain, and Daladier conferred during the afternoon and evening, Czechoslovakia being unrepresented. The agreement (dated Sept. 29) was actually signed just after midnight. Hitler secured about all that he had demanded: evacuation to take place between Oct. 1 and Oct. 10, under conditions arranged by an international commission, which should also determine the plebiscite areas. Britain and France undertook to guarantee the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. When the Polish and Hungarian minorities questions were solved, Germany and Italy would give a like guaranty. The Czech government felt impelled to acquiesce in this settlement on Sept. 30. | 12 |
| The statesmen, returning from Munich, received warm ovations from their peoples, and there could be no doubt that the will to peace was strong, not only in Britain and France, but also in Italy and Germany. The crisis, however, soon led to much dispute. Many felt that the democratic powers had not only deserted the one democratic outpost in Central Europe, but that they had suffered a tremendous defeat, which might have been avoided if the strong stand taken just before the Munich conference had been maintained. Others believed that the German case in Czechoslovakia was too strong to justify war against Germany, and that Hitler, far from bluffing, was determined to march. In any event, the final outcome established German hegemony in Central Europe and opened the way to domination of the entire Danubian area. | 13 |
| THE SETTLEMENTS: | 14 |
| (1) GERMAN. The occupation was carried through as scheduled at Munich, taking over all the vital Czech frontier fortresses. The predominantly German regions were determined by the Austrian census of 1910. The international commission caused Germany no trouble, and in the end there were no plebiscites. Germany acquired about 10,000 square miles of Czech territory, with about 3.5 million inhabitants, of whom about 700,000 were Czechs. By agreement with the Czechoslovak government (Nov. 20, 1938), Germany was given rights to a highway across Moravia to Vienna, and to a canal connecting the Oder and the Danube Rivers. The truncated Czechoslovak state, without defensible frontiers, became of necessity a satellite of the Reich. | 15 |
| (2) POLISH. During the crisis the Polish government had renewed its long-standing claims to the Teschen region. On Sept. 29 a virtual ultimatum was submitted to Prague, to which the Czech government yielded. On Oct. 2 Polish forces occupied the Teschen area, and Czechoslovakia lost about 400 square miles of territory with some 240,000 inhabitants (less than 100,000 Poles). | 16 |
| (3) HUNGARIAN. The Hungarian claims to Slovakia were to be settled by negotiation, and delegates of the two countries met on Oct. 9. Agreement proved impossible, and serious clashes took place on the frontier. Ultimately the matter was adjusted by joint decision of Germany and Italy. Hungary received a broad strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia, almost 5,000 square miles, with a population of 1 million. The Hungarian claim, supported by Poland, for a common frontier with Poland was denied. | 17 |
| As a result of Hitler's immense victory, the Little Entente disappeared as an important factor in international relations. What remained of Czechoslovakia fell entirely under German influence. Much the same was true of Hungary and the other Danubian countries. The Czech alliances with Russia and France became all but valueless, and the Franco-Russian alliance of 1935 lost most of its significance. Germany now emerged as the strongest power on the Continent. | 18 |
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| Nov. 16 |
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| The Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16 was put into force, despite the fact that the conditions of enforcement had been only very imperfectly fulfilled. | 19 |
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